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The present work considers the mental imaging of faces, with a focus in own-face imaging. Experiments
1 and 3 demonstrated an own-face disadvantage, with slower generation of mental images of one’s own
face than of other familiar faces. In contrast, Experiment 2 demonstrated that mental images of facial
parts are generated more quickly for one’s own face. Finally, Experiment 4 established that a bias toward
local processing is advantageous for one’s own face, whereas a global-processing bias produces an
enhanced own-face disadvantage. The results suggest that own-face imaging is more synchronized with
retrieval of face features and less attuned to a face’s holistic pattern than is imaging of other people’s
faces. The authors propose that the salient information for own and other face identification reflects, in
part, differences in the purpose and experiences (expertise) generally associated with processing of own
and other faces. Consistent with work examining the range of face processing, including other-race faces,
our results suggest that not all faces receive the same holistic emphasis.
Keywords: face processing, cognition, processing of own face, feature–holistic processing, expertise
The goal of the present study was to explore a distinction
between the processing of two classes of faces, both familiar. In
particular, we wished to compare the processing of one’s own face
with the processing of other highly familiar faces. The idea that
different classes of faces may be processed differently is widely
accepted. For example, at least four findings suggested that famil-
iar and unfamiliar faces are processed differently. First, a double
dissociation has been observed in prosopagnosic patients charged
with recognizing familiar and unfamiliar faces (e.g., Carlesimo &
Caltagirone, 1995; Malone, Morris, Kay, & Levin, 1982; Taka-
hashi, Kawamura, Hirayama, Shiota, & Isono, 1995; see also
Warrington & James, 1967). Second, activation of different brain
regions has been shown on presentation of familiar and unfamiliar
faces (Andreasen et al., 1996; Henson et al., 2003). Third, when
scanning familiar and unfamiliar faces, dissimilar patterns of eye
movements have been observed in prosopagnosic patients (Rizzo,
Hurtig, & Damasio, 1987). Finally, the pattern of evoked poten-
tials varied for the processing of familiar and unfamiliar faces
(e.g., Uhl, Lang, Spieth, & Deecke, 1990). In the current article,
we focus on subdivisions within the class of familiar faces, spe-
cifically, one’s own face as compared with other familiar faces.
In our study, we measured the time participants took to generate
either a mental image of their own face or that of other highly
familiar faces. The task of mental imaging is subjective, and as
such, its use as a research tool could be questioned. However, a
rich research program has successfully used this task—despite its
subjective nature—to uncover the structure of visual, long-term
memory representations (e.g., Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978; for
reviews, see Kosslyn, 1980, 1994). Thus, whereas the final product
of this task, indeed, is not subject to direct observation, its by-
products—in particular, response latencies associated with perfor-
mance—seem to be highly reliable and, as such, are useful in
constraining theory. As we argue in this article, systematic analysis
of performance in the face-imaging task can provide insight into
processing of different classes of facial stimuli as a function of the
difficulty involved in recalling information from long-term mem-
ory.
The motivation behind the comparison of own face and other
familiar faces is driven by the notion that perceptual experience—
which at its culmination turns into expertise—plays a critical role
in the recognition and retrieval of objects, whether they are written
words, objects, or faces (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). We assume that
the nature of the experience is a function of the goal to be obtained
through the act of perception, with a different goal typically set for
perceiving one’s own face as compared with those of other famil-
iar people. Indeed, the goal of processing another’s face is most
often to identify it (“who is this person?”), whereas the goal of
processing one’s own face is almost never identification but,
rather, an inspection of individual facial features, such as in the act
grooming (see Tarr & Pinker, 1989). Under these assumptions, it
would not be surprising to find evidence of qualitatively different
processing for these two classes of face stimuli.
Stemming from the extensive experience that humans have with
facial patterns, the face-recognition system has presumably been
shaped to rely on more holistic processing (Gauthier, Curran,
Curby, & Collins, 2003; Tanaka & Farah, 1993, 2003). By relying
on holistic information, different individuals—all with similar
features but different configurations—can be efficiently recog-
nized. Indeed, it has been argued that the holistic processing of
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faces has an evolutionary advantage whereby rapid face recogni-
tion is essential for social survival (Farah, Rabinowitz, Quinn, &
Liu, 2000).
However, the information likely to be stored about one’s own
face—from which a mental picture could be generated—would
more appropriately capture the fragments of one’s face that are
salient reminders of how one generally regards one’s own partic-
ular face. Therefore, the stored information used to generate men-
tal images of one’s own face would presumably rely more heavily
on these readily available facial features than on a less available
holistic representation. Theorizing in other perceptual domains
suggests that generating an image of one’s own face ought to be
slower if the goal is an entire face image. Specifically, processing
time is slower when local features and relationships must be
integrated to achieve a whole pattern as compared with working
off of an already compiled whole (Kimchi, 1994). Thus, if a whole
configural pattern of one’s own face is mediated by a process of
integrating separable features, then own-face mental imaging
should be slower relative to processing of faces that rely more on
stored holistic patterns.
To place this investigation in a larger context, one might con-
sider the investigations into own-race bias in face recognition. In
brief, recognition of faces of those from another race is generally
poorer than that of faces among one’s own race (e.g., Meissner &
Brigham, 2001). A variety of cognitive explanations have focused
on the possibility that as compared with other-race faces, own-race
faces are processed more holistically, giving a high premium to
configural relationships (Rhodes, Tan, Brake, & Taylor, 1989;
Sangrigoli & de Schonen, 2004). In contrast, faces of those from
other races receive less configural analysis. Levin (2000) and
Levin and Angelone (2002) have made a case that the goal of
own-race face perception is typically identification, thereby lead-
ing to a high level of individuation of this class of faces. In
contrast, the goal of other-race face perception may more likely be
race classification, resulting in an absence of individuation for this
class of faces as a result of the lack of expectation that further
interactions with that person will take place. Thus, the act of
perception with the different classes of faces is postulated to
evolve in response to the purpose, or goal, which is to be attained
through experience with the different classes of faces.
If configural and holistic analysis is at the core of own-race face
recognition as a means of individuating frequently encountered
others (Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006), then it is
of interest to explore whether the broad holistic analysis that
dominates processing of faces from one’s own race applies equally
well to processing of the frequently encountered own face, for
which the processing goals are entirely different. We suggest that
it cannot. Instead, we predict that in comparison with other famil-
iar faces, one needs relatively little configural information about
one’s own face, for there are almost no occasions that require one
to individuate one’s own face for the purpose of identification.
Note that other differences exist between the information that may
be stored regarding one’s own face and others’ faces (e.g., one’s
own face is typically perceived in mirror-transformed views; see
General Discussion for other possible candidates). Whereas we are
not discounting the importance of other such differences, the focus
of the present investigation—as an initial venture into own-face
processing—is directed toward whether the difference between
holistic and featural information may provide a partial account for
differential processing of own and other faces, if indeed such
differential processing can be demonstrated.
Support for holistic processing of faces—without consideration
of own-face recognition—is extensive. Although, object recogni-
tion is generally mediated by embedded parts (Biederman, 1987;
Tanaka & Farah, 1993), face recognition is more dependent on
holistic analysis (e.g., Tanaka & Farah, 1993). Thus, although
object parts (e.g., house doors) were recognized equally well as
upright whole objects-, inverted whole objects, or in isolation, by
contrast, face parts (e.g., nose) were best recognized within upright
faces (e.g., Farah, 2000). Additionally, Palermo and Rhodes
(2002) found that when an upright face served as a target, partic-
ipants were able to match (same–different) flanking faces more
easily when the flanking faces were inverted than when they were
upright. Presumably, less interference occurred when the targets
and flankers shared fewer holistic-processing resources. Indeed,
Farah, Wilson, Drain, and Tanaka (1998) postulated that face
recognition is a “special” form of pattern recognition in that “it
involves relatively little part decomposition” (p. 484). Moreover,
in a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence, McKone,
Martini, and Nakayama (2003) concluded that that holistic pro-
cessing of faces often proceeds without any part decomposition.
Finally, face recognition based on an undifferentiated whole may
be so fundamental to face processing that it begins at a very early
age (as early as 4 years of age; Pellicano & Rhodes, 2003).
Although face recognition seems to rely primarily on holistic
processing, the neuropsychological literature supports a dissocia-
tion between own and other face recognition. Thus, Turk et al.
(2002) tested a split-brain patient, who viewed a series of morphed
photos that ranged from 0% self (and 100% familiar) to 100% self
(and 0% other) and judged whether the photo was of oneself or of
a familiar other. Results indicated a double dissociation. The
participant’s left hemisphere showed a bias toward recognizing
morphed faces as self, whereas his right hemisphere was biased
toward the familiar other (for further neuropsychological evidence,
see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Keenan, Nelson, O’Connor,
& Pascual-Leone, 2001).
Further evidence of the dissociation between one’s own face and
others’ faces comes from cognitively intact individuals. Kircher et
al. (2000) investigated the functional anatomy of processing self-
relevant information by tracing localized magnetic resonance im-
aging signals as participants judged (a) the familiarity of photos
morphing a stranger’s face and their own face and (b) the famil-
iarity of photos morphing a stranger’s face and their partner’s face.
Results showed that the left fusiform gyrus was activated for the
faces that included one’s own face but not for faces that included
the highly familiar partner’s face.
Behavioral evidence has also suggested that own-face process-
ing may be different from that of other faces. Face recognition
appears dependent on the angle of view (Bruce, Valentine, &
Baddeley, 1987). Troje and Kersten (1999) found a frontal advan-
tage for one’s own face, with frontal views increasing identifica-
tion more for one’s own face than for other familiar faces. Laeng
and Rouw (2001) observed that the optimal viewing condition for
other faces was 22.5°, whereas own-face viewing showed a sig-
nificant frontal advantage (but see Tong & Nakayama, 1999).
Recently, Brédart, Delchambre, and Laureys (2006) compared the
impact on foveal word processing of flanking faces and found that
own-face flanks had a more deleterious effect than did other-face
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flanks when flanking faces were incongruent with names appear-
ing in the foveal region. It was not clear as to why own-face
flankers were stronger distractions, but the findings suggested that
processing of one’s own and other faces rely on different long-
term representations.
The apparent support for differences in the processing of one’s
own as compared with other faces comes, by and large, from
research involving facial recognition. To support our prediction
that own-face processing is qualitatively different from that of
other familiar faces, we used a face-imaging task. In this task,
participants were required to generate a mental image either of
one’s own face or of other people’s faces. Because the generation
of a mental image requires using preexisting representations in
long-term memory, this exercise can provide a window into the
characteristics of these representations. In addition, because face
imaging does not require having to present the physical nominal
stimulus, it was a natural candidate for our investigation, allowing
for the study of both participants’ own face and other familiar
faces, with familial relationship to participants serving as control
stimuli.
We argue that similar differences to those that have been doc-
umented using face recognition would be found with the face-
imaging task. This argument is based on converging evidence
suggesting that the tasks of perceptual recognition and mental
imaging utilize common representations, perhaps even in overlap-
ping parts of the brain. Thus, Farah (1988), along with Kosslyn,
Thompson, Kim, and Alpert (1995), have reported that visual
mental imaging engages a shared representation with higher visual
perception. A variety of other studies, testing both objects and
faces, reached similar conclusions (e.g., Ishai & Sagi, 1995;
Kosslyn et al., 1995; but see Behrmann, Winocur, & Moscovitch,
1992). Indeed, O’Craven and Kanwisher (2000) observed signifi-
cant overlap in the regions activated for the perception and the
mental imaging of famous faces. Statistical maps of activated
regions showed remarkable similarity for perception and imaging
tasks (see also Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004). These authors
concluded that the most plausible account of overlapping activa-
tions is that generating mental images and perceptual recognition
reflect common representations and/or analysis. Finally, Bryant
(1991) used multidimensional scaling and clustering techniques to
show that participants used the same general features to make
ratings when using pictures as when using mental imagery. There-
fore, theorizing regarding both the more holistic representation of
familiar faces and the significance of experience in guiding facial
recognition ought to apply to mental imaging.
Assuming that the experience with own-face analysis is likely to
favor features over holistic representation and that feature integra-
tion takes time to produce a whole pattern (Healy, 1994; Kimchi,
1994), we predicted that the time to generate an image of one’s
own face from long-term storage would differ from that of gener-
ating an image of other familiar faces. Moreover, we wished to
uncover the nature of the most readily available information stored
in long-term memory for one’s own face and other familiar faces
by varying the target images. Specifically, in Experiment 1, we
asked participants to generate target images of whole face. We
predicted that participants’ own face would be imaged more
slowly owing to their presumed reliance on a less well-integrated
whole. Indeed, an own-face disadvantage was found. Of course, it
is possible that own-face mental imaging could be slower for a
variety of other reasons (see the General Discussion for other
plausible candidates). Therefore, in an effort to more specifically
determine whether the most accessible stored information of one’s
own face is more featural, in Experiment 2 we asked participants
to generate target images in which facial features were prioritized.
The own-face disadvantage was either eliminated or reversed.
Experiment 3 was a replication of the own-face disadvantage
found in Experiment 1, implemented with a modified procedure.
Finally, in Experiment 4, we determined whether differences in
orientation toward whole or feature processing had a differential
effect on mental imaging of participants’ own face and other
familiar faces. To this end, prior to the actual imaging task, we
manipulated the processing orientation of participants toward ei-
ther the whole or the components. This was accomplished by
showing participants a series of single large letters (e.g., “H,”
henceforth, the global level) composed of small letters that were
different from the large letter (e.g., many “R”s, henceforth, the
local level; Navon, 1977). Processing orientation was manipulated
by asking participants either to identify the global patterns (i.e.,
orientation to whole) or to identify the local letters (i.e., orientation
to components). As detailed in the results, we found that process-
ing orientation affected the processing advantage of generating an
image for another’s face as compared with one’s own face.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we compared mental imaging of one’s own
face with that of other familiar faces. As a control to one’s own
face, we included celebrity faces (e.g., Ishai, Haxby, & Ungerlei-
der, 2002) as well as faces of family and friends of our partici-
pants. It is unclear which familiar face should serve as the best
comparison for one’s own face. When a face is generated, deeper
semantic associates are doubtless generated along with it. The
semantic associates available for family and friends are probably
best equated to that of one’s own face. Still, it could be argued that
because of the exposure in the mass media and tabloids, the
plethora of information available on celebrities far exceeds that of
most acquaintances, even close family members, and is equal only
to the information available on one’s own life. Because there is
little cost associated with generating mental images regarding
family and friends—faces that in a recognition task would be very
difficult to obtain—we asked participants to image, in addition to
their own face and faces of celebrities, faces of friends and of close
family members.
On the basis of pilot data, we found that an own-face disadvan-
tage in generation times could be obtained even with crude mea-
surement, using a stopwatch. Therefore, to highlight the possible
robustness of our findings, we used this procedure (for a comput-
erized version of the task, see Experiment 3) with the justification
that if such a crude procedure yields consistent results, it would
bolster the robustness of our effect.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four Union College students were paid
$3 for participating in the experiment.
Materials and design. The 15 to-be-imaged items included
objects and people whose faces, as revealed by preliminary testing,
were familiar to the participants. The objects were the following:
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teacup, elephant, red car, and leather chair. Four categories of
faces included celebrities, close friends, family members, and own
face. The celebrities were Tom Cruise, Barbara Streisand, Jack
Nicholson, and Marilyn Monroe. Family members were mother
and father.
The order of the 15 stimuli was randomized, with the constraint
that items from the same category not appear consecutively. The
same list of items was presented three times to each participant, in
a different order across trials. The design included item category
(own face, friend face, family face, famous face, and object) and
trial (first, second, third), both manipulated within participant.
Procedure. Individually tested participants were instructed to
image whole faces and objects as quickly as possible and to make
sure images were clear before responding. They were warned that
the images might not be of equal clarity but were asked to generate
a clear image quickly. Before the experiment began, the experi-
menter practiced reading each name at a constant pace and for the
same total time. Prior to testing, each participant practiced the
imaging task with a different set of familiar faces and objects from
that used in the actual experiment. For both the practice and target
trials, participants tapped a table once the image was formed.
Timing of a trial began when the experimenter completed read-
ing aloud the name of the to-be-imaged item. An assistant, who
was unaware of the experimental hypotheses or of the various
conditions, recorded participants’ response times (RTs) with a
stopwatch.
Results and Discussion
Imaging times were averaged across participants and are dis-
played in Table 1. Object RTs, though displayed, were not in-
cluded in the reported analyses for any of the experiments. Table
1 revealed that imaging of one’s own face was slower than that of
other faces and that the own-face disadvantage persisted across all
three trials. For this and subsequent analyses, all hypotheses were
treated as two-tailed.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded significant main
effects of trial, F(2, 46)  19.02, MSE  0.99, p
2  0.45, and
face category, F(3, 69)  14.49, MSE  0.83, p
2  0.39, ps 
.01. The interaction, F(6, 138)  4.85, MSE  0.31, p
2  0.17,
was also significant, p  .01. A pairwise comparison performed
with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons determined
that across trials, mental imaging of famous faces was slower than
that for friend and family faces ( p  .02), and, more importantly,
imaging of participants’ own face was slower than that of each of
the other three face categories ( p  .02). Thus, the results estab-
lished an own-face disadvantage in the imaging of whole faces.
Recently, Ishai et al. (2002) asked participants to image celeb-
rity faces. Because imaging latencies were not the focus of that
investigation, the performance of only eight pilot participants was
timed. Still, the mental-imaging times for famous faces in our
experiment were considerably slower than those observed by Ishai
et al. Most likely, the difference in overall RT was due to the use
of only celebrity faces in the Ishai et al. study, whereas all
categories (objects and the different types of familiar faces) were
presented in random order in the present study.
The results of our first experiment provided initial support for
the notion that own-face imaging is qualitatively different from
other-face imaging. A possible alternative interpretation for the
results is that the longer time needed to generate own-face images
may have been mediated by a subjective demand imposed by
participants on themselves to generate a clearer image of them-
selves than of others, a process that would be accompanied by
longer image-generation times. Sharper own-face images, as com-
pared with other-face images, might therefore account for the
own-face disadvantage. This possibility was addressed later in
Experiments 3 and 4, where clarity measures were taken in addi-
tion to latency measures. However, we first sought support for the
notion that the own-face disadvantage was mediated by featural
processing of one’s own face.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 tested whether the disadvantage for one’s own
face observed in Experiment 1 could be eliminated or reversed
when imaging instructions shifted the focus to local features (e.g.,
eyebrow width) and the positioning of local features (e.g., dis-
tances between facial parts; Leder, Candrian, Huber, & Bruce,
2001).
Method
The method for this experiment approximated that of Experi-
ment 1. However, instead of whole faces, participants now imaged
facial features or their positions within the face, including distance
between eyes, head shape, eyebrow thickness, and nose-to-mouth
distance. Features were imaged for Julia Roberts (high famous),
Christian Slater (moderate famous), Vanilla Ice (low famous),
mother’s face (family), friend’s face, and own face. Relative fame
was assessed through an independent sampling of participants not
involved in the imaging task. Prior to imaging features for a
particular face, the to-be-imaged feature was named. Subse-
quently, the experimenter—who was unaware of the experimental
hypothesis—recited the names at an even pace. Participants im-
aged that feature for the succession of faces. RTs were again
recorded by a naive assistant.
The order of both the sequence of features and the faces for each
feature was randomized across participants. To ensure that the
required feature was imaged, participants were instructed to per-
form a judgment or drawing task based on the imaged feature.
Thus, following the imaging, participants had to perform one of
the following: either to immediately select the correct facial shape
from a set of shapes; to place an eye on a chart at the proper
distance from a second eye; to mark where lips were located below
Table 1
Mean Imaging Times in Seconds (With Standard Errors) for the
Different Categories of Stimuli Across the Three Image-
Generation Trials
Item category Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Item mean
Own face 3.55 (.56) 2.30 (.25) 2.21 (.29) 2.69
Family face 1.97 (.24) 1.79 (.19) 1.56 (.18) 1.77
Friend face 2.25 (.21) 1.84 (.14) 1.57 (.15) 1.89
Famous face 2.67 (.24) 1.94 (.17) 1.70 (.17) 2.10
Object 2.16 (.17) 1.69 (.13) 1.41 (.10) 1.75
Trial mean 2.52 1.91 1.69
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a nose; or to trace the thickness of eyebrows with a pencil. In each
case, participants were instructed to work from the mental image
they had generated in response to the aforementioned name. This
procedure is akin to the widely used practice of asking readers
comprehension questions following the reading of a passage to
ensure that the reader is trying to comprehend the text while the
experimenter’s real interest lies in factors pertaining to the per-
ceptual qualities of the passage (see Koriat & Greenberg, 1994).
Latency for the mental images was computed on the basis of the
respondent’s time to tap the table on each trial and was recorded
before the feature judgment task was performed. Eighteen students
were paid $3 to participate.
Results and Discussion
Imaging times were averaged across participants and are dis-
played in Table 2. Examination of the results portrayed a trend
different from that found in Experiment 1. Own-face images
averaged across features were faster than all but family faces, to
which latency was about equal. In fact, for two categories of
features, own-image features were generated fastest. An ANOVA
confirmed the main effects of face category, F(5, 85)  18.72,
MSE  4.57, p  .001, p
2  0.52, and feature, F(3, 51)  4.04,
MSE  6.23, p  .02, p
2  0.19, but showed no interaction.
Next, we compared participants’ own face against all other faces
across all features combined. Individual comparisons of partici-
pants’ own face with every other face showed that across all
features, only family face showed no difference ( p  .05). Family
face and own face had comparable imaging times. Note that in
Experiment 1, when asked to image whole faces, participants’ own
face was imaged significantly slower than family face ( p  .02).
Therefore, it seems that for all face categories, the instructions to
image features changed the default processing from holistic to
featural, and either eliminated (family) or reversed (other catego-
ries) the previous own-face disadvantage. Still, mental imaging of
family faces allowed for greater flexibility in processing than did
imaging of other faces, thereby yielding RTs to own face more
comparable to those of family faces. Taken together, the results
confirmed our hypothesis that own-face imaging was more com-
patible with facial features than was holistic processing. The trend
appeared to be consistent both for features and for the positioning
of features within the face.
It is noteworthy that Ishai et al. (2002) also included a condition
in which participants were asked to generate an image of a facial
feature. Thus, participants were instructed to generate clear, vivid
images of a face and then were asked, for example, whether the
face had thick lips or a big nose. Ishai et al. reported that latencies
in this condition were not significantly different from those in the
condition where no question was asked regarding individual fea-
tures, a condition most similar to that of Experiment 1. How can
this be reconciled with our finding that feature imaging (Experi-
ment 2) was considerably slower than whole-face imaging (Ex-
periment 1)?
The clearest difference between these studies is that only in our
study were participants asked to directly image features. In Ishai et
al. (2002), in contrast, the entire face was first imaged, and only
once imaged, was a yes–no response required regarding the fea-
ture. Despite this critical difference, however, the pattern of per-
formance at a descriptive level was identical in both studies, with
slower RTs occurring in the feature condition than in the whole-
face condition. Indeed, the absence of a significant effect reported
by Ishai et al. most likely reflects the low power of their analysis,
which used the data from only eight pilot-study participants.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was designed to provide a computer-based repli-
cation of the own-face mental imaging effect. The use of the
stopwatch method in Experiments 1 and 2 highlighted the robust-
ness of the effect, showing that it could be found even in unfa-
vorable conditions that include large variability. Still, a computer-
based replication can better demonstrate the true magnitude of the
effect, with noise decreased to a minimum. Additionally, in Ex-
periment 3, participants were also asked to rate the clarity of their
images. This was undertaken to ensure that RT differences be-
tween the different image categories could not be attributed to a
trade-off between speed and clarity of the image.
Method
A total of 18 Tel-Aviv University students participated in the
experiment for monetary compensation. Each participant was ad-
ministered two trials of three to-be-imaged faces, which included
his or her own face and that of each of the participant’s parents.
Face category (own, father, mother) and trial (first, second) were
manipulated within participant. The words “your own face,” “your
father’s face,” and “your mother’s face,” as well as three other
names for the practice trials (“your sibling” and two celebrities),
Table 2








thickness Head shape Item mean
Own 2.60 (.32) 3.47 (.61) 2.11 (.26) 2.33 (.35) 2.64
Family 2.71 (.33) 2.80 (.26) 2.59 (.27) 2.22 (.19) 2.58
Friend 3.29 (.39) 3.93 (.56) 2.98 (.33) 2.55 (.17) 3.19
High famous 4.12 (.46) 3.99 (.47) 3.32 (.42) 3.32 (.49) 3.69
Moderate famous 5.17 (.65) 5.25 (.77) 4.89 (.65) 4.07 (.54) 4.85
Low famous 5.17 (.81) 5.93 (.60) 5.29 (.69) 4.03 (.61) 5.10
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were recorded on the computer. Trials were then presented by
auditory presentation of the face stimulus to be imaged.
The study began with presentation of the three practice images,
followed by two trials of the three test faces. In each trial, the
to-be-imaged names were counterbalanced such that each name
appeared only once and across participants each name appeared an
equal number of times as first, second, or third in order.
Prior to the presentation of each name, an asterisk appeared for
500 ms, immediately followed by a stimulus name, which was
sounded through the headphones. Imaging instructions were iden-
tical to those of Experiment 1. Participants were instructed to
create a clear image of the face and to press the space bar once a
clear image was formed. Timing was measured from the offset of
the sounded name until the space bar was pressed. Subsequently,
participants rated the clarity of the imaged face by pressing a key
from 1 (least clear) through 5 (most clear). The screen then turned
blank for 2,000 ms until the asterisk for the next name was
presented.
Results and Discussion
Table 3 presents the RT and clarity ratings for the first and
second trials. Examination of the data revealed a pattern identical
to that found in Experiment 1. In both trials, RTs were slower and
were rated less clear for participants’ own face than for a parent’s
face. A two-way ANOVA for the RT data, with face category
(own, father, mother) and trial (first, second) as within-participant
variables, found face category to be significant, F(2, 34)  30.51,
MSE  308,502, p  .0001, p
2  .64. Trial showed a marginal
effect, F(1, 17)  3.94, MSE  20,504, p  .06, p
2  .19,
suggesting faster performance in the second trial than in the first.
The Trial  Face category interaction was not significant, F(2,
34)  1.44, MSE  56,002, p  .10, p
2  .08. A planned
comparison of the face-category effect, comparing participants’
own face with father’s face and with mother’s face, revealed a
significant effect, F(1, 17)  41.41, MSE  454,582, p  .001,
p
2  .71, establishing that imaging times were slower for partic-
ipants’ own face than for a parent’s face. Post hoc Tukey analysis
showed a significant difference between own face and father’s face
( p  .001) and between own face and mother’s face ( p  .001).
Likewise, for the clarity data, face category was found to be
significant, F(2, 34)  6.57, MSE  0.36, p  .005, p
2  .28.
Both trial and the Trial  Face category interaction were not
significant (both Fs  1). A planned comparison of the face
category effect was significant, F(1, 17)  8.26, MSE  0.57, p 
.01, p
2  .33, establishing that clarity rating of participants’ own
face was lower than that of a parent’s face. Post hoc Tukey
analysis showed a significant difference between own face and
father’s face ( p  .01) and between own face and mother’s face
( p  .01). Critically, the slower imaging times found for partici-
pants’ own face could not be attributed to the generation of clearer
faces. On the contrary, the own-face disadvantage was revealed
not only in the RT data but also in the clarity ratings.
Experiment 3 demonstrated that the own-face disadvantage
could be replicated with a computer-based procedure and a re-
sponse mechanism controlled by the respondent. Generating an
image of one’s own face was significantly slower than generating
an image of the face of each of one’s parents. This effect persisted
for the first and second trials and could not be attributed to a
speed–clarity trade-off. Finally, the face category effect accounted
for an impressive 71% of variability in generation times. Taken
together with the effectiveness of the manipulations across the
previous three experiments (despite their more crude procedures),
the present findings provide consistent support for differential
processing of one’s own and other faces in the image-generation
task.
Experiment 4
We have interpreted the own-face disadvantage (Experiments 1
and 3) as mediated by featural processing of one’s own face. This
result was supported by an own-face advantage for the imaging of
local feature positioning (Experiment 2). In the current experi-
ment, we wished to provide even stronger evidence for the role of
featural processing of one’s own face by directly manipulating the
type of processing that the different face categories undergo. By
manipulating the type of processing, we wished to systematically
affect the imaging times of participants’ own face as compared
with those of other familiar faces.
Our manipulation was based on a recent study by Macrae and
Lewis (2002). These researchers biased participants’ processing
toward either local or global processing prior to their performance
of a face-recognition memory task. Participants who were oriented
toward local features performed worse in the recognition task than
did controls, who spent 10 min completing the unrelated filler task
of reading a passage from a novel. In contrast, participants oriented
toward global features improved their ability to recognize faces as
compared with the controls. Weston and Perfect (2005) used the
same biasing task with split faces and also found that a local-
processing bias leads to more local, feature-oriented processing of
faces.
In the current experiment, we used the local–global manipula-
tion to investigate own-face processing. Presumably, a bias toward
local processing would be compatible with own-face processing
Table 3
Mean Imaging Time in Milliseconds (With Standard Errors) and
Clarity Ratings (and Standard Errors) for First and Second
Trials as a Function of Face Category With
Computer-Based Presentation
Measure Response time (SE) Clarity rating (SE)a
First trial
Face category
Own 2,942 (620) 4.28 (.75)
Father 1,964 (761) 4.72 (.46)
Mother 1,992 (755) 4.67 (.49)
Own-face imaging effectb 964 0.415
Second trial
Face category
Own 2,782 (710) 4.33 (.77)
Father 1,989 (766) 4.78 (.43)
Mother 1,963 (626) 4.83 (.38)
Own-face imaging effectb 806 0.475
a Clarity ratings were measured on a subjective scale ranging from 1 to 5
(with 5 representing highest clarity). b The own-face imaging effect was
calculated as the absolute value difference between participants’ own face
and the mean of father’s and mother’s faces.
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expertise and, hence, would be advantageous for processing one’s
own face. In contrast, a global bias would be more consistent with
other-face expertise, thereby yielding an own-face disadvantage.
To ensure the robustness of our findings and to complement the
earlier procedures, we returned to the stopwatch procedure that
was used in Experiments 1 and 2. As in Experiment 3, participants
were asked to rate the clarity of their images to ensure that RT
differences, if found, could not be attributed to a trade-off between
speed and clarity of the image.
Method
The global–local orientation task (Macrae & Lewis, 2002;
Navon, 1977) was used as a between-participants variable. Face
category (own, mother) was manipulated within participant.
For the Navon task, a set of 50 index cards was used, with each
card consisting of a single large letter (e.g., “H,” henceforth, the
global level) composed of small letters that were different from the
large letter (e.g., many “R”s, henceforth, the local level). Each of
the 50 cards had a unique combination of large and small letters.
The index cards were presented for the global–local orientation.
For the orientation task, participants were asked to flip through the
deck of cards for 10 min. Randomly assigned participants were
asked either to identify the global patterns (half of the participants)
or to identify the local letters (the remaining half). Participants
flipped the through cards, saying each letter before turning to the
next card. The experimenter monitored performance to ensure that
the participants were following instructions. When no cards were
remaining, participants continued naming from the beginning of
the deck until 10 min had elapsed.
Following the orientation task, participants from either orienta-
tion imaged both their own face and their mother’s face, with order
balanced across participants. To ensure that there was no speed–
clarity trade-off, we obtained clarity ratings, on a scale ranging
from 1 (least clear) to 5 (most clear) from participants immedi-
ately after they indicated that the image was formed. The assistant
who recorded RTs was unaware of the hypothesis or conditions. A
total of 48 Tel Aviv University students were included.
Results and Discussion
Imaging times were averaged across participants in the two
orienting conditions and are displayed in Table 4. Examination of
the results revealed an interesting interaction for the imaging data,
with faster own-face imaging following local orientation relative
to global orientation and the reverse pattern in response to instruc-
tions to image mother’s face. An ANOVA on the RT data verified
a main effect of face category, F(1, 46)  4.8, MSE  0.7, p  .05,
p
2  0.09, as well as the critical interaction, F(1, 46)  46.6,
MSE  6.67, p  .001, p
2  0.5. Orienting task did not reach
significance (F  1). A Tukey least significant difference test
found that differences between participants’ own face and other
(family) face were significant for comparisons in the global ( p 
.001) and local ( p  .025) conditions. These findings clearly
indicate that processing orientation affected the processing of own
and other faces in an opposite manner.
Clarity data indicated that the imaging results did not reflect a
speed–clarity trade-off, as faster images were reported to be the
clearest. The interaction for clarity data was also significant, F(1,
46)  5.71, MSE  0.41, p  .05, p
2  0.11. Thus, although
own-face images were reported to be clearer when imaging fol-
lowed the local orienting task, they were reported as less clear
following the global orienting task. This finding is inconsistent
with the notion that a more stringent criterion was used for gen-
erating participants’ own face as compared with other faces and
that this more stringent criterion mediated the slower generation
times observed for participants’ own face. Instead, when whole
faces served as target images, their slower generation times seem
to be a genuine effect.
General Discussion
Three basic findings emerged from the studies reported in this
article. First, imaging of one’s own face was reliably slower than
imaging of other familiar faces (Experiments 1 and 3). Second,
imaging of parts of one’s own face were reliably faster than imaging
of other familiar faces (Experiment 2). Third, and most striking,
biasing participants’ processing toward global processing resulted
in an enhanced own-face disadvantage in imaging times, whereas
biasing processing toward local processing reversed the effect such
that an own-face advantage was found (Experiment 4).
It is noteworthy that the imaging speed for participants’ own
face relative to that of other familiar faces changed as a function of
task goal (whole face, Experiments 1 and 3 vs. face parts, Exper-
iment 2). Had participants simply held off declaring that an own-
face image was sufficiently clear before responding, thereby sug-
gesting that a criterion change mediated the slower latencies
observed for participants’ own face, then the aforementioned in-
teractions and changing patterns would have been most unlikely. It
would be unreasonable that in the more holistic mode, images of
participants’ own face would be slowly generated because the
clarity criterion was more stringent. If that were the case, then
when feature processing was targeted, the criterion for own-face
clarity would suddenly be relaxed. The possibility of a changing
criterion was also undermined by the reversal of mental imaging
patterns as a function of processing orientation (local vs. global,
Experiment 4) although relative clarity judgments remained con-
sistent across orientations.
The present outcomes fit well with a diverse set of findings
found in the face recognition literature. Although several neuro-
logical (e.g., Kircher et al., 2000, 2001; Turk et al., 2002) and
cognitive (e.g., Troje & Kersten, 1999) dissociations have revealed
differences in the processing of one’s own face as compared with
other faces, our study offers a suggested mechanism contributing
to these dissociations. Specifically, own-face generation may ac-
Table 4
Mean Imaging Times in Seconds and Clarity Ratings (With




Imaging time Clarity rating
Local SE Global SE Local SE Global SE
Own 2.65 (.30) 3.69 (53) 4.71 (.13) 4.29 (.16)
Family 3.44 (.27) 2.15 (.41) 4.29 (.13) 4.50 (.15)
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tivate different representations and processes—more feature ori-
ented and less holistic in nature than does generation of images of
other faces.
In general, however, our results maintain compatibility with the
holistic position advocated by Farah et al. (1998) for the case of
processing the faces of others. It is interesting to note that Ishai et
al. (2002) found that following the generation of famous face
images, questions that oriented a respondent’s attention to a face
feature (e.g., “thick lips”) resulted in increased brain activity in
the right intraparietal sulcus and the right inferior frontal gyrus
relative to when attention was directed to the whole face. Presum-
ably, it is possible that stored own-face representations that prior-
itize face parts would also trigger different retrieval pathways than
representations of those faces for which configural or whole-face
attributes are prioritized.
Halberstadt (2003) biased participants by emotional labeling of
faces during encoding. Later, participants were asked to judge
which of a string of emotional renditions of faces matched the
original face. These emotional labels altered initial target encoding
in the direction of foil faces where features reflected the original
emotional label. Moreover, the pattern was not observed for in-
verted faces for which holistic processing was disrupted. Addi-
tionally, Yovel, Revelle, and Mineka (2005) determined that per-
sonality traits, in particular obsessive–compulsive qualities, can
shape whether one focuses on the details or global patterns, indi-
cating considerable cognitive control in object processing.
Schooler (2002) suggested that talking about a face precipitates a
shift toward feature-based processing, that is, language descriptors
can disrupt usual holistic processing. Thus, one could speculate
about another interpretation of the present findings for which it is
assumed that one’s own face may implicitly engage a form of
verbal mediated processing that draws more heavily on features
than holistic analysis.
According to some (e.g., Gauthier & Tarr, 1997), expertise
affects object recognition in the direction of more holistic process-
ing and representation (alternatively, see Tanaka, Curran, & Shei-
nberg, 2005). Certainly, on the surface, the present findings seem
at odds with that contention. Yet, if it is assumed that expertise
builds with experience to provide the most efficient goal-directed
behavior (identification of other faces and scrutiny of own-face
particulars), then it makes sense that own-face processing would
center on local facial attributes, as that information is more com-
patible with behaviors associated with own-face analysis. Thus, as
with other-race face processing (Michel et al., 2006), the present
findings suggest that there is a limit to the generalizability of
holistic face processing.
The present findings are meant to stimulate consideration of
own-face processing, which heretofore had not received much
attention. Thus, the findings were not meant to exclude other
possible contributing factors of face processing that could also
distinguish one’s own face and other faces. One alternative can-
didate, as noted above, is verbal mediation. Another candidate is
personal relevance (see Kircher et al., 2000). However, the con-
trast of Experiments 1 and 3 (generating a complete face) with
Experiment 2 (generating face parts) and the findings of Experi-
ment 4 (biasing of processing by orienting task) make it clear that
at least one consideration regarding the mental-imaging task (and
face perception as well, e.g., O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000) for
one’s own face and other faces is that information extracted from
long-term storage for these two categories of faces differs.
Thus far, we have accounted for the feature-based nature of
own-face processing on the basis of the goals of perception. That
is, whereas the goal of own-face processing is primarily analysis of
facial properties, as in grooming, that of other-face processing is
primarily identification. An additional account may be that one’s
own face is seen either mirror reversed (in a mirror) or nonreversed
(in photos), whereas others’ faces are almost never seen reversed.
Mirror reversal should presumably only hurt configural informa-
tion, given that most, if not all, faces are slightly asymmetrical in
nature. It could be argued, therefore, that it may be difficult to
create a stable configural representation for one’s own face be-
cause the configural information is variable as compared with that
of other facial stimuli.
A caveat to the present understanding is that these trends are
specific to face mental imaging, in which information is accessed
from long-term storage. Ishai et al. (2002) determined that in a
famous-face mental-imaging task involving long-term memory,
akin to the task used here, brain activity was significantly different
from that observed when the identical faces were imaged after they
had been recently memorized (short-term storage). As in our study,
participants were asked to generate mental images in response to a
name. The patterns in brain activity observed in Ishai et al. caution
that the differences observed in the current study between partic-
ipants’ own face and other faces apply specifically to tasks that
involve mental images generated from long-term representations.
Thus, whether the relative advantages and disadvantages for one’s
own face hold for retrieval of short-term images or in recognition
tasks remains an open question. We speculate that processing of
stored information about one’s own face could be altered by task
demands and the memory systems drawn into the process. Regard-
less, it is apparent that own-face processing moves along more
efficiently against a baseline of other categories of familiar faces
when face features are emphasized and when the task involves
recall.
Finally, the present findings also serve as a reminder that face
imaging, central to such tasks as eyewitness retrieval, is likely to
vary in response to the goals and biases encouraged by the inquiry.
Indeed, much effort is currently being devoted to understanding
the accuracy and processes used by witnesses to retrieve (and most
often recall) useful face information in helping investigative teams
capture a witnessed individual (Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006).
References
Andreasen, N. C., O’Leary, D. S., Arndt, S., Cizadlo, T., Hurtig, R., Rezai,
K., Watkins, G. L., Ponto, L. B., & Hichwa, R. D. (1996). Neural
substrates of facial recognition. The Journal of Neuropsychiatry &
Clinical Neurosciences, 8, 139–146.
Behrmann, M., Winocur, G., & Moscovitch, M. (1992). Dissociation
between mental imagery and object recognition in a brain-damaged
patient. Nature, 359, 636–637.
Biederman, I. (1987). Recognition by components: A theory of human
image understanding. Psychological Review, 94, 115–147.
Brédart, S., Delchambre, M., & Laureys, S. (2006). One’s own face is hard
to ignore. Quarterly Journal of Psychology, 59, 46–52.
Bruce, V., Valentine, T., & Baddeley, A. (1987). The basis of the 3/4 view
advantage in face recognition. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 1, 109–
120.
506 GREENBERG AND GOSHEN-GOTTSTEIN
Bryant, D. J. (1991). Visual imagery versus visual experience of familiar
individuals. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 29, 41–44.
Carlesimo, G. M., & Caltagirone, C. (1995). Components in the visual
processing of known and unknown faces. Journal of Clinical and Ex-
perimental Neuropsychology, 17, 691–705.
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of
autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological
Review, 107, 261–288.
Farah, M. J. (1988). Is visual imagery really visual? Overlooked evidence
from neuropsychology. Psychology Review, 95, 307–317.
Farah, M. J. (2000). The cognitive neuroscience of vision. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Farah, M. J., Rabinowitz, C., Quinn, G. E., & Liu, G. T. (2000). Early
commitment of neural substrates for face recognition. Cognitive Neuro-
psychology, 17, 117–123.
Farah, M. J., Wilson, K. D., Drain, M., & Tanaka, J. W. (1998). What is
“special” about face perception? Psychological Review, 105, 482–498.
Ganis, G., Thompson, W. L., & Kosslyn, S. M. (2004). Brain areas
underlying mental imagery and visual perception: An fMRI study.
Cognitive Brain Research, 20, 226–241.
Gauthier, I., Curran, T., Curby, K. M., & Collins, D. (2003). Perceptual
interference evidence for a non-modular account of face processing.
Nature Neuroscience, 6, 428–432.
Gauthier, I., & Tarr, M. J. (1997). Becoming a “greeble” expert: Exploring
mechanisms for face recognition. Vision Research, 37, 1673–1682.
Halberstadt, J. (2003). The paradox of emotion attribution: Explanation
biases perceptual memory for emotional expressions. Current Directions
in Psychological Science, 6, 197–201.
Healy, A. F. (1994). Letter detection: A window to unitization and other
cognitive processes in reading text. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1,
333–344.
Henson, R. N., Goshen-Gottstein, Y., Ganel, T., Otten, L. J., Quayle, A., &
Rugg, M. D. (2003). Electrophysiological and haemodynamic correlates
of face perception, recognition and priming. Cerebral Cortex, 13, 793–
805.
Ishai, A., Haxby, J. V., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2002). Visual imagery of
famous faces: Effects of memory and attention revealed by fMRI.
NeuroImage, 17, 1729–1741.
Ishai, A., & Sagi, D. (1995). Common mechanisms of visual imagery and
perception. Science, 268, 1772–1774.
Keenan, J. P., Nelson, A., O’Connor, M., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2001).
Self-recognition and the right hemisphere. Nature, 409, 305.
Kimchi, R. (1994). The role of holistic/configural properties versus global
properties in visual form perception. Perception, 23, 489–504.
Kircher, T. T. J., Senior, C., Philips, M. L., Benson, P. J., Bullmore, E. T.,
Brammer, M., et al. (2000). Toward a functional neuroanatomy of
self-processing: Effects of faces and words. Cognitive Brain Research,
10, 133–144.
Kircher, T. T. J., Senior, C., Phillips, M. L., Rabe-Hesketh, S., Benson,
P. J., Bullmore, E. T., Brammer, M., Simmons, A., Bartels, M., & David,
A. S. (2001). Recognizing one’s own face. Cognition, 78, B1–B15.
Koriat, A., & Greenberg, S. N. (1994). The extraction of phrase structure
during reading: Evidence from letter detection errors. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 1, 345–356.
Kosslyn, S. M. (1980). Image and mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Kosslyn, S. M. (1994). Image and brain: The resolution of the imagery
debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kosslyn, S. M., Ball, T. M., & Reiser, B. J. (1978). Visual images preserve
metric spatial information: Evidence from studies of image scanning.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfor-
mance, 4, 47–60.
Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L., Kim, I. J., & Alpert, N. M. (1995).
Topographical representations of mental images in primary visual cor-
tex. Nature, 378, 496–498.
Laeng, B., & Rouw, R. (2001). Canonical views of faces and cerebral
hemispheres. Laterality, 6, 193–224.
Leder, H., Candrian, G., Huber, O., & Bruce, V. (2001). Configural
features in the context of upright and inverted faces. Perception, 30,
73–83.
Levin, D. T. (2000). Race as a visual feature: Using visual search and
perceptual discrimination tasks to understand face categories and the
cross-race recognition deficit. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 129, 559–574.
Levin, D. T., & Angelone, B. L. (2002). Categorical perception of race.
Perception, 31, 567–578.
Macrae, C. N., & Lewis, H. L. (2002). Processing orientation and face
recognition. Psychological Science, 13, 194–196.
Malone, D. R., Morris, H. H., Kay, M. C., & Levin, H. S. (1982).
Prosopagnosia: A double dissociation between the recognition of famil-
iar and unfamiliar faces. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psy-
chiatry, 45, 820–822.
McKone, E., Martini, P., & Nakayama, K. (2003). Isolating holistic pro-
cessing in faces (and perhaps objects). In M. A. Peterson & G. Rhodes
(Eds.), Perception of faces, objects, and scenes: Analytic and holistic
processes (pp. 53–71). London: Oxford University Press.
Meissner, C. A., & Brigham, J. C. (2001). Thirty years of investigating the
own-race bias in memory for faces: A meta-analytic review. Psychology,
Public Policy, and Law, 7, 3–35.
Michel, C., Rossion, B., Han, J., Chung, C., & Caldara, R. (2006). Holistic
processing is finely tuned for faces of one’s own race. Psychological
Science, 17, 608–615.
Navon, D. (1977). Forest before the trees: The precedence of global
features in visual perception. Cognitive Psychology, 9, 353–383.
O’Craven, K. M., & Kanwisher, N. (2000). Mental imagery of faces and
places activates corresponding stimulus-specific brain regions. Journal
of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12, 1013–1023.
Palermo, R., & Rhodes, G. (2002). The influence of divided attention on
holistic face perception. Cognition, 82, 225–257.
Pellicano, E., & Rhodes, G. (2003). Holistic processing of faces in pre-
school children and adults. Psychological Science, 14, 618–622.
Rhodes, G., Tan, S., Brake, S., & Taylor, K. (1989). Expertise and
configural coding in face recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 80,
313–331.
Rizzo, M., Hurtig, R., & Damasio, A. R. (1987). The role of scan paths in
facial recognition and learning. Annals of Neurology, 22, 41–45.
Sangrigoli, S., & de Schonen, S. (2004). Effect of visual experience on face
processing: A developmental study of inversion and non-native effects.
Developmental Science, 7, 74–87.
Schooler, J. W. (2002). Verbalization produces a transfer inappropriate
processing shift. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16, 989–997.
Takahashi, M., Kawamura, M., Hirayama, K., Shiota, J., & Isono, O.
(1995). Prosopagnosia: A clinical and anatomical study of four patients.
Cortex, 31, 317–329.
Tanaka, J. W., Curran, T., & Sheinberg, D. L. (2005). The training and
transfer of real-world perceptual expertise. Psychological Science, 16,
145–151.
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (1993). Parts and wholes in face recognition.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46A, 225–245.
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (2003). The holistic representation of faces.
In M. A. Peterson & G. Rhodes (Eds.), Advances in visual cognition:
Perception of faces, objects, and scenes (pp. 53–71). London: Oxford
University Press.
Tarr, M. J., & Pinker, S. (1989). Mental rotation and orientation-
dependence in shape recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 21, 233–282.
Tong, F., & Nakayama, K. (1999). Robust representations for faces:
507OWN-FACE IMAGING
Evidence from visual search. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 25, 1016–1035.
Troje, N. F., & Kersten, D. (1999). Viewpoint-dependent recognition of
familiar faces. Perception, 28, 483–487.
Turk, D. J., Heatherton, T. F., Kelley, W. M., Funnell, M. G., Gazzaniga,
M. S., & Macrae, C. N. (2002). Mike or me? Self-recognition in a
split-brain patient. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 841–842.
Uhl, F., Lang, W., Spieth, F., & Deecke, L. (1990). Negative cortical
potentials when classifying familiar and unfamiliar faces. Cortex, 26,
157–161.
Warrington, E. K., & James, M. (1967). An experimental investigation of
facial recognition in patients with unilateral cerebral lesions. Cortex, 3,
317–326.
Wells, G. L., Memon, A., & Penrod, S. D. (2006). Eyewitness evidence:
Improving its probative value. Psychological Science in the Public
Interest, 7, 45–75.
Weston, N. J., & Perfect, T. J. (2005). Effects of processing bias on
recognition of composite face halves. Psychological Bulletin & Review,
12, 1038–1042.
Yovel, I., Revelle, W., & Mineka, S. (2005). Who sees the trees before
forest? The obsessive-compulsive style of visual attention. Psychologi-
cal Science, 16, 123–129.
Received June 5, 2007
Revision received September 18, 2008
Accepted October 25, 2008 
508 GREENBERG AND GOSHEN-GOTTSTEIN
